Abstract. We are constructing an imperfect competition in a general equilibrium with non-consumable money and labor market; our toolkit is an equilibrium default model of Shubik-Wilson (1978). Our result has an 'equilibrium instability' simultaneously occurring at all three markets: labor, goods, and credit market, where a bank supplies fixed quantity of money. A worker and an entrepreneur strategically trade at these markets. Players are uncertain about each other's actions, and do not have a convergence of common beliefs of common knowledge. It is impossible to calculate mixed strategies equilibria exactly, but it is possible to identify some Pareto-efficient strategies and study induced prices, wages, interest rates, default, allocations and payoffs, which are all volatile, and their fluctuations are not independent. We present an equilibrium result, when a total default value is bigger than total money supply.
Introduction
There is an enormous literature on money, demand for credit and interest rate, see Walsh (2010) , or surveys in the volumes of the "Handbook of Monetary theory," (1990, 2000, 2010) . However, micro-foundations 1 for money demand are still not well-transparent. The suggestion of Clower (1967) to resolve the "an embarrassment to economic theory" was to integrate monetary and value theories by involving money in utility function. 3 Shubik 4 and Wilson (1978) , further (SW78), developed his model to resolve the Hahn paradox using fiat money in one period non-cooperative game. They introduced default as a possible equilibrium phenomenon. In contemporary terms, the paper of Shubik and Wilson studied a mechanism design of fiat money holding, not mentioned by Wallace (2010) on mechanism design for monetary economics.
The suggestion of Shubik and Wilson to consider default on credits as an equilibrium phenomenon matches the empirical facts. Although international statistics on defaults is far from being standardized, terminology is not unified, data are rarely public, it is possible to use the US delinquency rates on consumer credits, or on many other types of credits. It is easy to see that default on credits is the sustainable economic phenomenon, see Figure 1 .
Our model, based on SW78, unites elements of micro and macro economic analysis -labor market, goods market, credit market and default in monetary terms -into a general equilibrium framework with imperfect competition. This includes: strategic demand for labor, strategic labor supply, strategic trade in a real good, and imperfect competition for credits, as components of an economy. Activity in the economy is organized as one period non-cooperative strategic market game (Shaley and between one worker and one entrepreneur. The game has three prices in terms of fiat non-consumable money: nominal wage, monetary price of a consumable good and a nominal interest rate. The result of our paper is that equilibrium values of all endogenous variables -wage, price, interest rate, default, demand for money, and their interactions -can not be stable. Their values are exposed to unremovable joint volatility. In the general case this volatility can not be expanded into independent volatilities of separated markets. An equilibrium volatility of the game does not supply new information, and creates market distortions without traditional reasons: outside shocks, or/and information asymmetry. 5 Ambiguity in a choice of a numeraire good. 6 A loss in utility function, what breaks it's continuity. 7 The mechanisms are consistent, see further. 8 Lagos et al. (2017) surveys generations of the models: first-generation models, for example, Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1993) with indivisible assets and indivisible goods, "second-generation models make goods divisible and determine prices by bargaining." "Third-generation models, with goods and assets both divisible, but they all come with some baggage because they must deal with distributions of assets across agents," cited from Burret, Trejos and Wright (2017)
The equilibrium phenomenon appears from indeterminacies of players about possible actions of each other at all markets simultaneously.
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We additionally demonstrate Prisoners' Dilemma at the credit market, when a too small punishment for default can not enough reduce individual demands for credits ("pseudo-wealth"), and a resulting total value of debt exceeds total money supply, injected into the economy.
An economy of the model is a strategic market game of a worker and an entrepreneur. The worker has time, which he shares between a leisure time and working time. He enjoys the leisure and a produced good. The good is purchased at the goods market, and is produced jointly with the entrepreneur.
The entrepreneur has a production factor, which can be transformed into a fixed quantity of consumable good with a labor time of the worker. She consumes part of the produced good, and the rest sells to the worker through the goods market. The entrepreneur enjoys consumption of the good and managing the working time of the worker.
There are two real markets in the economy, goods and labor, but a barter exchange is prohibited. The worker and the entrepreneur compete for non-consumable fiat money credits from a bank, which offers a fixed money supply. 10 The credit is nominated in fiat money, which can not be consumed, but used only as a means of payment for real goods and credits.
The paper has the following structure: Section 2 discusses relation to existing literature, Section 3 presents the formal model, Sections 4 9 The idea is the same as in the colonel Blotto game. 10 We do not study monetary policy in the paper.
and 5 present approximation and numerical results related to microeconomics, Section 6 presents results related to macroeconomics.
Relation to literature
The standard understanding of credits assumes that all credits are payed completely and on schedule.
11 Our paper deviated from this by developing the model from SW78.
Walsh (2010) wrote about existence of the "three alternative modeling strategies" for studying demand for money. This includes representativeagent 12 models and overlapping-generations models. These models often assume perfect competition, infinite time, (for example, Bigo and Sannikov, 2018) and complete payments of debts. The third approach is an ad hoc construction of "equilibrium relationships that are often not derived directly from any decision problem." Demand for money, in this big strand of literature, is motivated by infinite life of economic agents: they need a means of trade, and share a belief in future of this means of trade. In macroeconomic literature an origin of an interest rate is usually vague or defined from perfect competition considerations.
The important contribution to resolve the paradox was done by SW78. Their insight was that default on credit should be incorporated into an equilibrium, while individual demand for money is regulated by a punishment for default. 13 The model of Shubik and Wilson is a 11 Like in IS-LM model. 12 In our model agents can differ in many respects. 13 Further we use the terms "demand for credit," "demand for money" and "demand for liquidity" as synonyms, even for practical purposes these terms may have differences.
playable non-cooperative game, where studying off-equilibrium cases is an investigation of feasible opportunities. Our result differs also from the result of the island economy of Lucas (Lucas, 1973) , where price-taking agents meet an incomplete information about environment, and prices change as ex post adjustment to a previous unknown outside shock. Volatility in our model is not an adjustment.
Our model is a one-period model. We expect to develop intertemporal part of the model in later papers. The presented model has a simplified vision of default, there are no next period consequences.
Many period model will be much more complex. But even in this simplified approach the instability does not need "noisy traders," Kyle (1977). We can attribute all volatility to "animal spirits" resulting from strategic decisions of market agents. The important property of our model is that even there is no stickiness of price, wage or interest rate and different kinds of menu costs, there is no synchronization volatility of the price, wage, interest rate and default value.
Pricing externalities in our model are similar to those in Gorodnichenko (2008), but here externalities are not necessarily positive.
For example, a spill-over effect from competition for a credit to real markets.
Our model exploits the property of simultaneous games, i.e. equal treatment of all markets, however real-life goods, labor and credit markets do have different stickiness.
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This requires reconstructing of the model as a sequential one, however it will not change the mathematical core of the problem, ill-posed property, but the formal side will become more complicated.
Model
Let player i = 1 be a worker, he owns Q 1 units of time, q 1 is his labor
and he enjoys own leisure, Q 1 − q 1 . The worker also enjoys a consumable good, which can be produced only together with an entrepreneur, i = 2.
The entrepreneur hasQ 2 units of non-consumable capital, which can be converted into a consumable good with labor supply q 1 from the worker. The entrepreneur can consume the capital only if there is no trade.
The production technology is a mapping of two factors, labor and capital, into the consumable good:
where
Labor supply q 1 does not effect production outcome Q 2 , but has a production cost b 2 for the entrepreneur. 16 She sells part of the produced good to the worker at the goods market. The entrepreneur values not sold quantity of the good, Q 2 − q 2 , and the bought worker's labor time q 1 .
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There are two real markets in the economy: labor, and goods, but a barter exchange is prohibited. Both agents need fiat money for trade.
Hence we introduce the third market, a money or market for credits, where a bank sells money and an interest rate is formed. 16 If a game is sequential, then more traditional production function can be used with a costly rise in complexity of the game. We assume that 0 < Q 1 ,Q 2 < ∞. 17 The assumption that a manager enjoys power over worker's time does not seem to contradict observations. 18 Domains for the monetary payments b 1 and b 2 are assigned after a description of how money enters into the economy.
At the goods market the entrepreneur chooses a quantity of the produced good to sell, q 2 , 0 < q 2 ≤ Q 2 , and the worker i = 1 chooses how much units of fiat money b 1 to pay for the consumable good. The price for consumable good is determined as p = 
Then i obtains a fiat money credit In a simultaneous game 21 which we study, i's total cash flow consists of: a credit Let µ be a punishment for default, µ > 0, for any negative money holding,
the punishment has an impact on ex ante motivation to take a credit: if
The payoff from final money holding comprises the role of money as fiat and non-consumable token:
A non-cooperative game requires strategy sets for every player, and let S i be i's strategy set defined as
where s i is a pure strategy of i, and it consists of three actions: a supply q i , from the one-dimension compact; a money payment b i , from the two-dimension compact; and a demand for liquidity, d i , from the one-dimension compact. Demand for money d −i from another player −i is not controlled by i, but it has an impact on a size of available credit 21 A sequential game adds more realism, but it is more complicated for analysis.
for i, and, imposes a restriction on a range of feasible payments b i . The set S i is four-dimensional, a boundary of S i has two one-dimensional facets, and one two-dimensional facet, but i directly controls only three of dimensions. In the general case S i is neither convex nor concave, see an example below.
Utility of i consists of a payoff from consumption and a payoff from holding final money balance:
The utility function captures the ideas that money is required only for trade, to pay the credit back, and it does not have intrinsic value. 22 The payoffs Strategic market games have a continuum of pure strategies equilibria (Peck, Shell, 1978) . Hence, one can take any set of pure strategies and construct over them a mixed strategies equilibrium. So the game has many mixed strategies equilibria. We do not address the full generality of the task, but only demonstrate some properties of the game, using pure Pareto-improving strategies. But first, we need to introduce mixed strategies and construct the first order condition.
be a set of mixed strategies of i, where normalization condition is the Lebegue integral with a general element for a mixed strategy
Domain of integration is written explicitly, as it can not be constructed as a cartesian product. This also implies that actions of i can not be statistically independent.
Expected utility of i is
Player i controls only own mixed strategy,
We are interested in a trading equilibrium, which must have incentive compatibility property for both players, i = 1, 2: Nash equilibrium is a pair of mixed strategies (µ 1 , µ 2 ) such that for
Nash equilibrium exists due to generalization of the fixed point theorem for a finite product of infinite-dimensional spaces 23 as a mapping of a bounded, closed, convex, continuous set into another, (
. Equilibrium incentive compatibility for trade is such that for every i there is
23 Tikhonov theorem guarantees compactness of the product.
First order condition of i is derived using methods of calculus of variation:
(2)
where λ i = 0 is any non-zero Lagrangian multiplier,
is unknown probability distribution or unknown mixed strategy, σ −i ∈ ∆ −i . Informally, the first order condition means that for every pure strategy s i , s i ∈ S i , the payoff of one player should be smoothed by mixed strategies of another player, and it must be true for every s i .
Equation ( Ill-posed problem is often approximated by Tikhonov regularization procedure. However, this method does not guarantee that an obtained solution is non-negative and can be appropriately normalized. At the moment it is unclear, how to approximate mixed strategies for this kind of strategic market games. Our approach is explained in details further.
Construction of an approximation
The technical difference with our previous paper (Levando and Sakharov, 2018 ) is that the game is the generalized Nash game (Debreu, 1952?), where a strategy of one player has an impact on a feasibility of strategies for other players. 
Nodes of Tchebyshev polynomials of the 1-st kind, or collocation points, are locations for these points. These polynomials provide the best approximation in a class of polynomials of the order no bigger than dim.
Collocation points are more sparse in the middle and more concentrated closer to intervals bounds.
The approximating set of i's strategies has 4 dimensions, each dimension has index in the range 1, . . . , dim. Let index t 1 (or t 1i to emphasize that it is a decision variable of the player to move i) be reserved for a supply q i of player i, the index r 1 (or r i similarly) is reserved for M be a credit, and a total set of possible credits for i make a conditional feasible payment set
or a quantity of fiat and non-consumable money available for i with a general element b i,t 2 ,r i ,r −i . The set B i,r i ,r −i is a two dimension compact.
Every B i,r i ,r −i is discretized by collocation points with index t 2 (or t 2i ).
i.e.
such that for fixed r i and r −i player i has a feasible payment set, which we label the same as above. Due to discretization player i has dim payment actions for every B i,r i ,r −i .
The total set of payment actions of i is
For numerical simulation we take values of endowments Q 1 = Q 2 = 10, and money supply M = 3. Table ? ? demonstrates different feasible payment sets B i,r i ,r −i set for i = 1 from different demands for credits d −i,r −i from −i. The variable r −i is an exogenous parameter for every layer of possible actions of i. The 4D set appears as we need to enumerate internal points of the set of strategies, not only discrete number of points on the boundary of S i . It is easy to see on Figure ? ? that the surface of S i is be is neither convex, nor concave. Restrictions for demand for money:
Approximation of the payoff function. Payoff function
is defined over S i × S −i ⊂ R Utility from consumption is borrowed from SW78:
For player i = 1 the first term √ Q i − q i is the leisure, for i = 2 is consumption of the good. The second term q 2 for i = 1 is consumption, for i = 2 is working time.
We approximate U i and construct a block-diagonal matrix with a trapezoid rule, and do this in two steps. First, to construct a block we fix indices r i and r −i and vary indices
Then, we move across blocks, changing r i and r −i , what changes the interest rate.
In every row of every block an interest rate is fixed, and supply and demand of −i for real good markets vary. In a raw we change q −i and b −i by varying l i,1 , l i,2 , in columns we change q i and b i by varying
, where const 1 , . . . , const 4 are some relevant constants. 24 A payoff for a fixed interest rate and fixed (q i , b i ) can be approximated as:
, where α t 1 ,t 2 ,l 1 ,l 2 ,r i ,r −i = (1/2) n , n -is a number of jointly non-equal to 1 or dim indices.
The coefficients α t 1 ,t 2 ,l 1 ,l 2 ,r i ,r −i appear from an approximation of 2-dimensional plane in a 6-dimensional space S i × S −i . They can be independently calculated from orthogonal properties of Tchebyshev polynomials. For notational simplicity let
The indices pair r i , r −i fixes an interest rate, and for these indices we make a matrix
The indices l 1 and l 2 increase along raws of the matrix X(r i , r −i ), from 1 to dim; indices t 1 and t 2 increase along columns, from 1 to dim. Thus, there dim 2 rows and dim 2 columns in every block. Every X i (r i , r −i ) is constructed for two fixed demands for liquidity from both agents, and there are dim 2 of such matrixes.
A matrix of unknown probabilities for a pair (r i , r −i ) is a dim 2 column vector σ −i (r i , r −i ):
where (l 1 , l 2 ) is a number of (approximating) mixed strategies
Every row is an unknown mixed strategy of −i, i.e. a probability
change from 1 to dim for every σ −i (r i , r −i ).
Approximating the first order condition for a fixed (r i , r −i ) we have:
where λ i (r i , r −i ) is a dim 2 colomn vector.
. . , dim correspond to strategies of i, λ 1,t 1 ,t 2 corresponds to fixed q i,t 1 and b i,t 2 actions of i. The same in matrix notation
meaning that given r i , r −i and respective money demands
equilibrium condition smoothes all fluctuations for all indices t 1 , t 2 = 1, dim. Approximation of the first order condition (2) for all (r i , r −i ) ∈ {1, dim} generates a block-diagonal matrix, size dim 2 × dim 2 :
, and
Then the approximating system of equations is
Instability of inverting X i to an increase in approximation parameter
dim can be demonstrated by conditional number (Fadeev, 1959):
is a smoothed matrix for some ≥ 0. The sign is a transposition operation, and I(dim) is a unit matrix of an appropriate order. Some conditional numbers for dim = 7 and players with Q 1 = Q 2 = 10 are presented in the Table ? ?. Table 2 . Some conditional numbers for dim = 7 0 1/500 1/100 1/10 1/5 player 1 2.7E9 6.24E6 1.25E6 1.25E5 6.24E4 player 2 7.46E10 6.25E6 1.25E6 1.25E5 6.25E4 Table ? ? demonstrate that a decrease in regularization parameter explodes the condition number of an approximating matrix X i . The observed instability of X i (dim) immediately implies the ill-posed property of the original integral equation (2).
Conditional numbers in

Construction of Pareto-improving strategies
We study only Pareto-improving strategies, as in Levando and Sakharov, (2018) . Their approach guarantees that ex ante every player will be better off in comparison to no-trade equilibrium, a trade will occur, but it does not guarantee absence of default. We will numerically demonstrate this effect below.
A set of all Pareto-improving strategies will have positive probability in some mixed strategies equilibrium by the following reasoning. Assume an opposite, and they do not have an equilibrium at these points.
Then it is possible to find another pure strategies profile, which will provide a better result for a player, but this does not guarantee that another player will be not be worse off. Construction of the set of PE strategiesis based on incentive compatibility, thus another player may not trade in this case, and the deviation will result in no-trade equilibrium. In LS we demonstrated numerically a case, why there is no strict dominance in the set.
be a pair of such Pareto-improving strategies. Further examples present simulations for endogenous variables constructed only for this type of strategies. 5.1. Approximation of prices, interest rate and default. Table   ? ? demonstrates an effect of a punishment increase to a number of Pareto-improving strategies, a number of PE points decreases. We can also see that an increase in a number of discretization points dim increases number of points under investigation.
In further calculations we use values M = 3 for money supply and µ = 1 for punishment. Table ? . Total value of default in the economy as a sum of non full-filed credit liabilities of both agents is:
The numerical example is presented in Table ? ?, and as earlier, all variables are non-stable. Table ? ? presents a s numerical example, when both agents have default for a fixed dim and µ. Easy to see that an increase in punishment decreases a share of default cases.
Macroeconomic features of the model
Above we have demonstrated the approximation machinery of our approach. In this section we address to simulation of interactions between variables. Volatilities at different markets are not independent, thus, we need 3D diagrams to demonstrate frequency distributions of possible outcomes. We present only frequency distributions of domains for points, which appear with positive probabilities. between strategic default and a default, caused by a bad luck.
This conclusion matches the sustainable empirical existence of positive delinquency rates on consumer credits, mentioned in the Introduction. Every consumer demands a credits being not aware of demands from others, and her/his decision is individually motivated. Every consumer chooses demand for credit individually as expects to be better off, being imperceptibly in competition with others for the credits.
If credit standards are loose (not enough credit rationing in terminology of Stiglitz and Weiss) this immediately leads to over-crediting, and to the Prisoner's dilemma in terms of bigger debts and defaults from externalities.
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Actually, the situation can be much worse, value of defaults from borrowers can exceed total lended money. We assumed that a demand for credit is limited from above by total money supply. If a punishment for default is not big, total debts can wipe out value of lended money, see Figure ? ?. Total money supply is M = 3, market with a solid 25 The discussion of a role of credit standards can be found in "Managing the leverage cycle," of Geanakoplos (2011).
vertical line in the column µ = 1. An increase the punishment from µ = 1 to µ = 3 diminishes demand for credits, and total value of debts does not exceed M = 3.
Our result differs from approach of Lucas and financial literature on the signaling role of price fluctuations. Both agents, perfectly informed about fundamentals of the economy, can not discriminate between reasons for non-stable price (or interest rate, wage, labor supply). Nonstability is caused either by asymmetric information, outside shocks, or/and oligopolistic trade.
Another side effect of the same question is: simulated market instabilities are market specific or not? The outcome of our model is that the reasons are not market specific. They come from indeterminacies of conjectures between players, operating at few markets simultaneously, 26 that can not be expanded into market specific components.
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This was impossible to demonstrate with only two strategies and one market in LS18.
The important feature of the suggested interpretation of SW78 is a consistent general equilibrium model, which assembles production, unemployed resource, non-consumable money and default in fiat nonconsumable money. These are features specific for static macroeconomic analysis, not microeconomic. In other words, the suggested interpretation is the oligopolistic general equilibrium model, which includes three markets: labor, good and credit. 26 Like in the colonel Blotto game. 27 The reason is that in we can expand a multidimension random variable into a product of probabilities of components only when there is independence between components:
Shubik and Wilson (1978) suggested the perfect competition to fill in the gap between micro and macroeconomics, Our paper expands their approach to the non-perfect competition in a simultaneous game.
Discussion
We construct a model with imperfect competition at three markets: To be able to predict a crisis from over-borrowing the model need to be multi-period. But already it predicts that Pareto-improving trade and production do not guarantee absence of default. Spill-over of default to financial sector is also a prediction of the model. Table 6 . Comparison of a share of events of defaults among Pareto-efficient strategies dim = 5, µ = 1 dim = 6, µ = 1 dim = 5, µ = 3 dim = 6, Share of default in the set of Pareto-improving strategies 59% 66% 32% 42% Table 8 . Every player a continuum responses, for every fixed parameter, the set of responses is linear. 
